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Abstract  
 
 
Several studies have analyzed the trade and output effects of the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United States and the European Union, but our 
paper is the first attempt to study its welfare effects. We measure the welfare effect of TTIP as 
the percentage of initial consumption that households would be willing to pay for TTIP in order 
to remain as well off with TTIP as without it. The discounted present value of the welfare gain 
of TTIP, which leads to the elimination of tariffs and cuts in non-tariff measures by 25%, is in 
the range of 1% to 4% of initial consumption, depending on the parameterization. The welfare 
gain increases in the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. The bulk 
of the welfare gain is caused by cuts in non-tariff measures. 
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2 
1 Introduction 
 
The pros and cons of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the 
United States (US) and the European Union (EU) are intensely debated. Felbermayr et al. 
(2015a), for instance, argue that the advantages have both economic and geostrategic 
components: the elimination of tariffs and non-tariff measures (NTMs) between the US and 
the EU should increase trade and output. In addition, a regulatory cooperation should help to 
impose Western standards in the world trade system. Felbermayr et al. (2015a) emphasize that 
the critics of TTIP argue that the possible benefits are modest and fear that TTIP may trigger 
a race to the bottom in health, safety, labor and environmental standards. 
 
As emphasized by Felbermayr (2015), the quantitative modeling of the pros and cons of TTIP 
is “a gargantuan task” and TTIP studies differ in several dimensions, but important ones are 
the model structure, the measurement of NTMs and the scenario definition. The latter 
dimension is particularly difficult, because regulatory coherence is the key of TTIP and 
researchers can only guess the exact nature of the partnership before its conclusion. 
 
We participate in the TTIP debate by employing a model structure that is different from the 
ones previously used in the TTIP literature: a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model, based on Ganelli and Tervala (2015), which allows us to analyze 
transition dynamics of TTIP.1 Ghironi (2016) argues—in the context of the Trans-Pacific 
                                                 
1 Capaldo (2014) does use an old Keynesian model to analyze TTIP. However, Bauer and Erixon (2015) highlight 
that the model Capaldo (2014) uses is not designed to analyze the effects of trade agreements. Most notably, it is 
(continued) 
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Partnership—that it is important to account for the transition dynamics of major trade deals, 
which extend far beyond reductions in tariffs. In contrast, all other main TTIP studies use trade 
models and are therefore unable to analyze transition dynamics.  
 
We use the NTM estimates of Berden et al. (2009), who find that NTMs for US–EU trade are 
on average 18% in ad valorem equivalent terms. Our scenario is that TTIP eliminates tariffs 
entirely and reduces NTMs, while we ignore several key elements of TTIP. Berden et al. (2009) 
introduce the concept of actionability, the degree to which NTMs can realistically be reduced. 
They find that NTMs for US–EU trade are on average 18%, of which roughly half are 
actionable, and analyze the consequences of 25% and 50% reductions in NTMs. Several 
economists regard a 50% reduction in NTMs too optimistic. Following the work of Francois 
et al. (2013) and Fontagné et al. (2013), our baseline scenario is that TTIP leads to the 
elimination of tariffs and a cut in NTMs of 25%. We would like to emphasize that it is beyond 
the capacity of all models to plausible estimate all aspects of the most comprehensive trade 
deal in history. Therefore, we ignore, among others, the most debated aspects of TTIP: the 
standards of investment protection and the Investor State Dispute Settlement. 
 
Our main contribution is to evaluate the welfare effects of TTIP, while the earlier literature 
focuses on its trade and output effects. Aichele et al. (2014) and Felbermayr et al. (2015b) 
argue that they analyze the welfare effects of TTIP, but their welfare measure is in effect the 
                                                 
“a demand-driven model that does not make efforts to capture the supply-side effects of trade which are the effects 
that are proven to be the core positive effects of trade liberalization” Bauer and Erixon (2015, 2). 
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change in real income that is equal to output. We believe that the utility function of households 
is the relevant welfare measure and provides the best objective in terms of which the pros and 
cons of TTIP should be assessed. We measure the welfare benefit of TTIP in consumption 
equivalent terms: as the percentage of initial consumption that households would be willing to 
pay for TTIP in order to remain as well off with the TTIP case as without it. 
 
The discounted present value (DPV) of the welfare gain of TTIP is 1.5% of initial consumption 
under the benchmark parameterization. This means that TTIP yields the welfare improvement 
that corresponds to a one-off 1.5% increase in consumption. In dollar terms, the welfare gain 
for a US (EU) citizen corresponds to a one-off 780 (510) US dollars increase in consumption 
(based on the World Bank (2016) data on 2012 GDP per capita in 2014 US dollars). In the new 
steady state, the welfare gain of TTIP is only 0.016% of initial consumption and it corresponds 
to an annual 8 (5) US dollars increase in consumption for a US (EU) citizen. These results are 
new since the existing literature contains no analyses of the welfare effects of TTIP. 
 
Robustness checks reveal that the welfare effects of TTIP are sensitive to changes in the Frisch 
elasticity of labor supply, the within-country substitutability (the elasticity of substitution 
between two goods produced in the same country) and the cross-country substitutability (the 
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods). First, a high Frisch elasticity 
implies a high labor supply and output response to TTIP. The more output increases, the higher 
the welfare effect is. Second, if the within-country substitutability is low and consequently the 
initial level of employment and output are low, then the welfare gain of TTIP will be higher. 
Third, if the cross-country substitutability is changed from the benchmark value of 3 to 6 (8), 
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the welfare gain increases from 1.5% of consumption to 2.7% (3.8%). In an imperfectly 
competitive economy, an increase in employment and consumption that brings them closer to 
their efficient levels increases welfare. The welfare gains of TTIP, therefore, depend positively 
on the degree of the cross-country substitutability. If the cross-country substitutability is 8, the 
DPV of the welfare gain on a US (EU) citizen corresponds to a one-off 2,000 (1,300) US 
dollars increase in consumption. 
 
Drozd et al. (2014) emphasize that the international trade literature shows that trade reacts 
notably to persistent price changes but not to temporary ones that take place on business cycle 
frequency and this property leads to very different estimates of the cross-country 
substitutability, depending on the time horizon. In international macro and trade literatures, 
completely different sizes of cross-country substitutabilities have been used, depending on the 
question at hand. In this paper, we analyze the welfare effects of trade liberalization that shifts 
relative prices permanently. Therefore, for the question at hand, a high cross-country 
substitutability may be a more realistic description of the reality, particularly in the long term. 
 
Berden et al. (2009), Francois et al. (2013), and Fontagné et al. (2013), who analyze the 
identical scenario, find that TTIP increases output in the US and the EU on average by 0.2-
0.4% in the long term. In our benchmark parameterization, the long-term output effect is 
0.16%. Raza et al. (2014) summarize that the output and trade effects of TTIP are sensitive to 
the choice of the elasticity of substitution between goods, because it governs how strongly the 
model will react to trade liberalization. If we set a high cross-country substitutability, as done 
in practice in TTIP studies, we will find that the output effects are in the same range as in 
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Berden et al. (2009), Fontagné et al. (2013) and Francois et al. (2013). On the other hand, our 
finding, regarding the role of the elasticity of substitution between goods on the output effects 
of TTIP, is inconsistent with TTIP studies. Felbermayr et al. (2015b), for instance, show that 
lower values of the elasticity of substitution lead to a higher output effect of TTIP, since 
domestic and foreign goods are less easily substitutable. In our DSGE model with endogenous 
labor supply, domestic and foreign goods are more easily substitutable if the cross-country 
substitutability is high and households respond to trade liberalization by supplying more labor. 
The higher the cross-country substitutability, the larger the output effect of TTIP. 
 
Following the earlier TTIP studies we also look at the effects of a TTIP agreement that is 
limited to liberalizing tariffs only. A tariffs-only agreement induces a considerably smaller 
output effect, which is in line with the other TTIP papers. Our main focus is, however, on 
welfare. The welfare gain of a tariffs-only agreement under the benchmark parameterization is 
0.6% of consumption, which is roughly one third of the welfare gain of the baseline scenario. 
We can therefore conclude that the bulk of the welfare gain of TTIP is induced by cuts in 
NTMs. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents 
the parameterization of it. Section 4 analyzes the effects of TTIP, focusing mostly on the 
welfare effects. It also examines the sensitivity of the main results to variations in key 
parameters values. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
    
 
7 
2 Model 
In this section, we introduce a New Keynesian model of trade liberalization that is based on 
Ganelli and Tervala (2015). We go beyond their approach in that we allow for both tariff and 
non-tariff barriers, because the latter constitute the major barriers to trade between the US and 
the EU. Furthermore, we allow trade barriers to be adjusted gradually. 
 
The world is made up of two countries: home and foreign. Firms and households are indexed 
by ]1,0[z . Households and firms over the [0,n) interval are located in the home country, 
whereas the rest [n,1] are located in the foreign country. In the description of the model, if the 
equations are symmetric across countries, we present only domestic ones.  
 
2.1 Households 
The domestic household’s lifetime utility is given by the function 
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In this equation 10    is the discount factor, tC  is a consumption index to be defined below, 
 is a positive parameter, tM  is nominal money balances, 0  is the inverse of the 
consumption elasticity of money demand, )(sP  is the consumption price index, )(zlt  is the 
household’s labor supply, and   is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The expression )(P
denotes the fact that the price index is a function of the trade barriers, which we denote as  . 
They are the sum of a tariff ( t
t ) and NTMs (
NTM
t ): 
NTM
t
T
tt   . Price indexes and the 
effect of trade barriers on them are shown below. 
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The overall consumption index is given by2 
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tC  and 
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tC  represents the consumption of domestic and foreign goods, respectively, 
and ρ > 0 is the cross-country substitutability.  n )10(    denotes the share of 
domestic goods in the consumption basket, which depends on the relative size of the home 
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where )(zcht  and )(zc
f
t
 are the respective consumption levels of differentiated domestic and 
foreign good z by the domestic household, and θ > 1 is the within-country substitutability. 
                                                 
2 The foreign consumption index is 
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foreign consumption basket. Home bias requires α* < 1. 
(continued) 
    
 
9 
We assume, for the sake of simplicity, that both countries impose (ad valorem) tariffs and 
NTMs on all imported goods. The optimal allocation of consumption between different types 
of goods is governed by the following demand functions:3 
t
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holds for producer prices but not for consumer prices in our model. Households allocate their 
total consumption between domestic and foreign goods, taking into account relative prices 
(including trade barriers), the cross-country substitutability, and the degree of home bias in 
consumption. The effect of trade liberalization is clearly visible here: a reduction in trade 
barriers reduces the price of imported goods and thereby the consumer price index. 
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The budget constraint of the domestic household is given by4  
  tttttttttttt TPCPzlwMDtDM )()()(1 111    ,   (5) 
where
1tD denotes an internationally traded bond purchased in period t-1 that pays one unit of 
domestic currency  plus the nominal interest rate 
1ti  in period t. The term tw  represents the 
nominal wage rate, t is nominal dividends (profits), and tT  denotes real transfers from the 
government.  
 
The optimal choices with respect to the intertemporal allocation of consumption, the labor 
supply and money demand is given by  
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4 The budget constraint of the foreign household, because the bond is denominated in the domestic currency, is  
   ********** 1* 11** )()()(1 tttttttttttttt TPCPzlwMSDiSDM    ,   
where 𝑆𝑡 is the nominal exchange rate, defined as the price of the foreign currency, expressed in the domestic 
currency. A global asset-market clearing condition requires that 0)1( *  tt DnnD . 
(continued) 
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Equations (6) is a consumption Euler equation. Equation (7) shows that a reduction in trade 
barriers increases the supply of labor by decreasing the price level and thereby increasing the 
real wage. Equation (8) determines the demand for money. 
 
2.2 Government and Trade Liberalization 
We assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the government repays tariff and seignorage 
revenues to households in a lump-sum manner. The government budget constraint, in per-
capita terms, can be written as5 
1
* )()()(  tttt
f
t
T
ttt MMSzpzcTP  .      (9) 
In equation (9), the first term on the right hand side is revenue from import tariffs. It depends 
on the tariff rate ( T
t ), consumption of foreign goods, and their domestic currency price. 
Our way to analyze the effects of TTIP differs from the traditional approach in that we also 
analyze transition dynamics, rather than just the long-term effect. For that reason, the timing 
of the implementation of liberalization measures is crucial. Therefore, we have to model trade 
liberalization caused by TTIP differently. Petri and Plummer (2016) emphasize—in the context 
of the Trans-Pacific Partnership—that trade policy is gradual. Because this seems reasonable 
for TTIP as well, we assume that it will have a gradual effect on transatlantic trade barriers. 
 
We assume that the change in effective trade barriers is given by 
  ttt  ˆˆ1ˆ 1  ,         (10) 
                                                 
5 The foreign tariff revenue (R*) from import tariffs is  tt
h
t
T
tt SzpzcR 1)()(
***  .  
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where   is—loosely speaking—the “depreciation rate of trade liberalization” and tˆ  
represents an unexpected change in trade barriers. Percentage changes from the initial steady 
state (denoted by the subscript zero) are denoted by hats; for example, 
0
ˆ  tt d . Trade 
liberalization is modeled as a permanent negative shock to trade barriers. Equation (10) 
captures the idea that a trade policy change caused by the TTIP deal is gradual and after some 
time the steady-state level of trade barriers is lower than before.  
 
Finally, we assume a constant supply of nominal money balances, that is, 1 tt MM = 0 for all 
t. This implies that lump-sum transfers from the government to household are equal to tariff 
revenues. 
 
2.3 Firms 
The domestic firm maximizes its profits  
)()()()( zlwzyzpz ttt
h
tt  ,       (11)  
taking into account the production function )()( zlzy tt   and the demand curve for its goods. 
The trade barriers do not appear in equation (11), because we assume that they are borne by 
consumers. However, because the demand functions of consumers are affected by trade 
barriers, there is an indirect effect on profits. As shown in Ganelli and Tervala (2015), the 
profits can be written as 
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As shown in Ganelli and Tervala (2015), the optimal price under Calvo pricing (Calvo 1983) 
is 
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st ,  is the stochastic discount factor between periods t and s, and 
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The log-linear version of equation (13) can be written as 
  t
h
t
h
t wzpzp ˆ1)(ˆ)(ˆ 1    . 
The change in the optimal price is thus a weighted average of the changes in current and future 
nominal marginal costs, which in this model are solely determined by nominal wages.   
2.4 Consolidated Budget Constraint 
As shown in Ganelli and Tervala (2015), the consolidated budget constraint for the domestic 
economy can be written as 
)()(1 zyzpDDCP t
h
tttttt    ,       (15) 
where
tP is the domestic price index without trade barriers. 
 
The model is log-linearized around a symmetric steady state, where initial net foreign assets 
are zero )0( 0 D . Equation (15) therefore implies that 00 yC  . As in Ganelli and Tervala 
(2015), the initial level of employment and output is  
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This equation illustrates that the level of output depends on trade barriers and the within-
country substitutability. Trade barriers increase the price level, and this in turn reduces the 
labor supply and output. 
 
3 Parameterization 
The parameterization of the model, summarized in Table 1, is chosen to match the features of 
the US and the EU. We choose 2012 as the base year in order to make the comparisons to the 
other TTIP studies easier. In 2012, the GDPs of the US (roughly 16,200 USD billions) and the 
EU were (roughly 16,600 USD billions) almost of equal size (Felbermayr 2014). We set the 
relative size of the home country (n) to 0.5. This simplifies the analysis.  
 
We interpret periods as quarters. Thus the discount factor is set to 0.99. The consumption 
elasticity of money demand )1(   is set to 1, based on Mankiw and Summers (1986). The 
Frisch elasticity of labor supply ( ) is set to 1, based on Keane and Rogerson (2012). 
 
The within-country substitutability (θ) is set to 11, based on the estimates of Basu and Fernald 
(1997). This implies a 10% price markup in the steady state. As discussed in Ganelli and 
Tervala (2015), in a model with endogenous labor supply, the degree of the within-country 
substitutability is a key parameter for the welfare analysis of trade reforms, because it affects 
the initial output level (though not the response of the economy to shocks). If the within-
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country substitutability is low, then initial output is low and an increase in output and 
consumption (of given size) increases welfare substantially. 
 
As highlighted by Drozd et al. (2014), the empirical literature points out that international trade 
reacts substantially to persistent price changes but not to temporary ones that take place on 
business cycle frequency. This implies that the estimates of the cross-country substitutability 
differ significantly, depending on the time horizon, with lower short-term estimates than long-
term estimates. Consequently, they highlight that different estimates have been used in 
international macroeconomics and trade, depending on the question at hand. In international 
macroeconomics, which focuses on high-frequency time-series predictions of models, it is 
typical to use low short-term estimates, whereas in the trade literature, which focuses on cross-
sectional implications, high long-term estimates are typically used. 
 
On one hand, in international macroeconomics, the cross-country substitutability is often set 
to the range of 1 to 2. On the other hand, referring to the empirical work of Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2004) and Bergstrand et al. (2013), Felbermayr et al. (2015b) argue that the trade 
elasticity—the elasticity of substitution between goods minus one—of 7 is plausible for models 
that use aggregate trade flows. Our baseline choice for the cross-country substitutability is 3. 
This is a compromise between values used in the macro and trade literature, and is roughly 
consistent with the findings of Feenstra et al. (2014), who use a consumption index similar to 
ours. They find that the median estimates of the micro elasticity (elasticity between alternative 
import suppliers) are between 3.2 and 4.1, whereas the macro elasticity (elasticity between 
domestic and foreign suppliers) may be somewhat lower. We later assess how sensitive the 
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welfare effects of TTIP are to changes in the cross-country substitutability in particular, since 
higher values may be more realistic in the long term.  
 
Table 1. Parameterization of the Model 
Parameter Baseline value Description 
  0.99 Discount factor 
n 0.5 Relative size of the 
domestic economy 
  1 Inverse of the 
consumption elasticity of 
money demand 

 1 Frisch elasticity of labor 
supply 
  11 Within-country 
substitutability 
  3 Cross-country 
substitutability 
  0.75 Calvo parameter 
TB  0.028 Initial tariff rate 
NTM  0.181 Initial NTM 
  0.2 Depreciation rate of trade 
liberalization 
tˆ   200.209))0.136(-((1-  Trade liberalization shock 
α 1.895 Home bias parameter 
α* 0.105 Home bias parameter 
 
 
Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) discover that the trade-weighted median price duration of US 
exports and imports is roughly one year. Based on this, we set the Calvo parameter (γ) to 0.75 
so that the average delay between price adjustments is one year (four periods). 
 
Trade barriers are the sum of tariffs and NTMs. Fontagné et al. (2013) find that the ad valorem 
tariff rate on bilateral trade is on average 2.2% in the US and 3.3% in the EU. We set the tariff 
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rate to the average of these numbers, 2.8%. The TTIP literature has used the NTM estimates 
of Berden et al. (2009). They find (their Table 4.2) that the costs of NTMs for US exports to 
the EU and for EU exports to the US are on average 18.5% and 17.7%, respectively, in ad 
valorem equivalent terms. We set NTMs to 18.1%, which is the average of these numbers. So 
the initial overall trade barrier is 20.9%. 
 
Berden et al. (2009) introduce the concept of actionability, the degree to which NTMs can 
realistically be reduced in a period of 10 years. They find that up to roughly 50% of all NTMs 
are actionable. Therefore, they analyze the consequences of 25% and 50% reductions in NTMs. 
Raza et al. (2014), for instance, debate that a 50% reduction in NTMs is too optimistic. Francois 
et al. (2013) and Fontagné et al. (2013) analyze trade liberalization that leads to a cut in the 
tariff rate of 98–100% and a cut in NTMs of 25%. We assume that TTIP leads to the 
elimination of tariffs and a cut in NTMs of 25%. This means that the trade barrier is reduced 
from 20.9% to 13.6%. 
 
As mentioned earlier, a key difference of our model relative to the earlier TTIP literature is 
that we also analyze the short- and medium-term adjustment of the economy. In the basic case, 
we assume that the “depreciation rate of trade liberalization” )(  is 0.2 and the size of the 
permanent trade liberalization shock )ˆ( t  is  1000.209))0.136(-((1- . Together, these 
parameters imply that trade barriers are gradually reduced from 20.9% to 13.6%. 
 
Home bias parameters (𝛼 and 𝛼∗) are set such that the import-to-GDP ratios match the US–
EU trade. However, we have to simplify the analysis assuming balanced trade. Consequently, 
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the share of imports is identical in both countries, which means that 𝛼∗ = (1 − 𝑛𝛼)/𝑛. 
According to Felbermayr (2014), EU exports to the US were roughly 550 USD billions, while 
US exports to EU were roughly 455 USD billions in 2012. Therefore, the EU import-to-US 
GDP ratio was somewhat above 3%, while the US import-to-EU GDP ratio somewhat below 
3%. We set α to 1.895 and α* to 0.105, implying that the initial import-to-GDP ratio is 3% in 
both countries.6 
 
4 Welfare Effects of TTIP 
In this section, we analyze the welfare consequences of TTIP. Following the idea of Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2007), we measure the welfare benefit of trade liberalization as the 
percentage of consumption that households would be willing to pay for liberalization in order 
to remain as well off with the liberalization case as without it. As shown in Ganelli and Tervala 
(2015), the percentage of initial consumption that the household is willing to pay for trade 
liberalization ( t ), referred to as the value of trade liberalization in the figure, in period t is 
].1)ˆˆ)(1[exp(100 110 

ttt llC
      (17) 
The DPV of the welfare effect as a percentage of initial consumption is 
].1))ˆˆ()(1[exp(100 110 



 ss
ts
ts
DPV llC
     (18) 
Equation (18) illustrates that the welfare effect of TTIP depends on the changes in consumption 
and labor supply and the initial level of labor supply. 
 
                                                 
6 We use the method of Klein (2000) and McCallum (2001) to simulate the model. 
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4.1 Results for the Baseline Calibration  
In this section, we analyze the consequences of TTIP. Figure 1 shows the effects of TTIP, 
which is signed in period 1 on the main variables. The horizontal axes indicate time in all 
figures. The vertical axes in panels (a) and (d) show percentage deviations of output and 
international trade from the initial steady state. Figure 1(c) shows the level of trade barriers. 
The value of trade liberalization, shown in Figure 1(b), is measured as a percentage of initial 
consumption. 
 
Figure 1. Dynamic Effects of TTIP 
 
 
Figure 1(c) shows that trade barriers are gradually reduced. Our way of modelling of trade 
barriers implies that they begin to decrease one quarter after the TTIP deal is signed. Trade 
liberalization reduces distortions on the labor supply (recall equation (7)), because it increases 
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real wages by decreasing the consumer price level. Figure 1(a) illustrates that TTIP increases 
output gradually, which is due to the gradual reduction in trade barriers that exert a gradual 
deflationary pressure. One year after the TTIP deal is signed, output has increased 0.08%, 
while the long-term effect is 0.16%.7 Countries and shocks are identical, and consequently 
TTIP increases output in both countries by the same amount. The positive output effect of trade 
liberalization is consistent with the empirical evidence of Dollar and Kraay (2004). Berden et 
al. (2009) is the only paper in previous literature that analyzes the short-term output effects 
(“an immediate impact”) of TTIP. They find that output increases in the short term by 0.05% 
in the US and 0.11% in the EU. In our paper, the output effect one year after the shock is in 
line with these results.  
Table 2 gives an overview of the related TTIP literature and summarizes the main findings of 
our paper and other TTIP studies.8 Table 2 shows that our finding regarding the size of the  
 
Table 2. Basic Assumptions and Main Results 
 This study Berden 
et al. 
(2009) 
Fontagné 
et al. 
(2013) 
Francois et 
al. (2013) 
Felbermayr 
et al. 
(2015b) 
Aichele 
et al. 
(2014) 
Basic assumptions 
                                                 
7 One can see that in the quarter when TTIP is signed, output drops slightly. This is caused by the expectation of 
reduced trade barriers in the next period while the presence hasn’t changed much yet: households expect prices 
to fall from then on and the incentives to work and consume more to increase. But in the initial period, neither 
the marginal utility of holding real money balances (due to the constant nominal money supply) nor the incentive 
to work more hours are much affected, while the real interest rate rises due to the expected deflation. This latter 
effect results in a fall in current consumption.     
8 Several papers address the effects of TTIP. We compare our results with studies that we regard as most closely 
related.  
    
 
21 
Model type DSGE CGE 
(GTAP7) 
CGE 
(GTAP) 
CGE 
(GTAP8) 
Gravity 
model 
Gravity 
model 
Name of 
reference 
scenario 
Baseline 
scenario 
Limited 
scenario 
Reference 
scenario 
Ambitious 
experiment 
Benchmark Deep 
TTIP 
Tariff 
reduction 
100% Goods: 
100%; 
services 
75% 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
NTM 
reduction 
in reference 
scenario 
25% 25% 25% 25% Trade 
creation by 
RTA 
 
Trade 
creation 
by RTA 
Forecasting 
period 
Dynamic 
model; 2012 
base year 
10 years; 
2008–
2018 
10 years; 
2015–
2025 
10 years; 
2017–2027 
Unclear; 
2012 base 
year 
Unclear; 
2007 
base 
year 
Main findings 
EU GDP 0.16% 0.32% 0.3% 0.48% 3.9% (EU 
average) 
2.12% 
US GDP 0.16% 0.13% 0.3% 0.39% 4.9% 2.68% 
Change in 
EU exports 
to US  
17% 0.9% 7.6% 28.0%  212% 
Change in 
US exports 
to EU 
17% 2.7% 10.1% 36.6%  171% 
Welfare 1.5% of 
consumption 
     
 
long-term output effect is smaller than in Berden et al. (2009), Fontagné et al. (2013) and 
Francois et al. (2013). A common factor of all these studies is a rather small increase in GDP. 
Aichele et al. (2014) and Felbermayr et al. (2015b) find a much larger output effect. The key 
difference is that their scenario is different: a NTM reduction in the reference scenario 
corresponds to the estimated trade creation effects of previous regional trade agreements 
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(RTA). Therefore, the size of trade liberalization is much larger, and this explains the 
remarkable difference in output and trade effects. 
 
Figure 1(d) illustrates that international trade increases gradually following gradual 
liberalization. The trade effect in our model is much larger than in Berden et al. (2009) and 
Fontagné et al. (2013), but smaller than in Francois et al. (2013). The trade effect in Aichele et 
al. (2014) is completely different. This is due to the different scenario. Consequently, a 
comparison of our results with theirs is difficult to manage. 
 
 
Figure 1(b) plots the welfare effect, measured by the percentage of initial consumption that the 
household is willing to pay for TTIP in each period, as shown by equation (17). It shows that 
households are willing to pay 0.004% of their initial consumption to avoid TTIP in the first 
period, which means that the welfare effect is negative. However, the welfare effect soon turns 
positive. In an imperfectly competitive economy, an increase in output and consumption that 
brings them closer to their efficient levels increases welfare. In the new steady state, TTIP 
yields a welfare gain that corresponds to a 0.0016% increase in private consumption. Based on 
the World Bank (2016) data on 2012 (the base year) GDP per capita in 2014 US dollars, the 
annual welfare benefit of TTIP on a US (EU) citizen corresponds to an 8 (5) dollar increase in 
consumption in the steady state. 
 
Table 2 shows that the DPV of the welfare gain of TTIP is 1.5% of initial consumption. We 
would like to emphasize that this is defined as the one period consumption equivalent change 
in the DPV of flow utility for TTIP. Under the baseline parameterization, households are 
    
 
23 
willing to pay 1.5% of their initial consumption for TTIP in order to remain as well off with 
the TTIP case as without it. The DPV of the welfare gain of TTIP on a US (EU) citizen, based 
on the World Bank (2016) data on 2012 GDP per capita in 2014 US dollars, corresponds to a 
one-off (roughly) 780 (510) US dollars increase in consumption. These results are new, since 
the existing literature has not assessed the welfare effects of TTIP. 
 
4.2 Robustness Checks: Varying Parameters 
In this section, we check out how sensitive the main results are to changes in key parameter 
values. We first analyze the role of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and the within-country 
substitutability, and then we shed light on the cross-country substitutability. Table 3 
demonstrates the dependence of the welfare effects of TTIP on the within-country 
substitutability and the Frisch elasticity. The within-country substitutability is usually set in 
the range of 6 to 20 in macro models, implying a massive range of markups between 20% and 
5%, also implying a range of possible initial output and consumption levels. We therefore 
employ these two boundary values in order to shed light on the upper and lower bounds of the 
welfare effects of TTIP. 
 
Keane and Rogerson (2012) find that the Frisch elasticity can be as high as 2, whereas Chetty 
et al. (2013) argue that it should be set to 0.5 on the intensive margin. Therefore, we vary it 
between 0.5 and 2. The main innovation of Ganelli and Tervala (2015), relative to the existing 
models in the literature on trade agreements, was to show that the welfare effects of trade 
liberalization are sensitive to the Frisch elasticity, because an endogenous labor supply changes 
the underlying steady state. 
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First, Table 3 reveals that an increase in the Frisch elasticity implies an increase in the welfare 
effect of TTIP. This is because the stronger the labor supply response to trade liberalization is, 
the stronger the boosts to output and consumption. Second, the lower the within-country 
substitutability is, the bigger the welfare effect. This is because a low elasticity implies a low 
initial level of employment and output so that an increase in output and consumption will 
increase welfare more. Overall, Table 3 shows that the range of possible values of these two 
elasticities allows for welfare effects in the range of 0.59% and 3.6% of initial consumption. 
 
 
Table 3. The Welfare Effects of TTIP:  
The Role of Different Within-Country Substitutabilities and Frisch Elasticities 
 6  11  
(benchmark) 
20  
5.0  1.7 1.0 0.59 
1
(benchmark) 
2.7 1.5 0.90 
2  3.6 2.0 1.2 
 
 
 
Raza et al. (2014) highlight that the elasticity of substitution between goods is crucial for TTIP 
studies, because it governs how strongly the model will react to trade liberalization. In our 
model, the cross-country substitutability can differ from the within-country substitutability. 
The latter affects only the level of initial employment and output, but not the response of the 
economy. Consequently, in our model, the cross-country substitutability is important. 
 
Raza et al. (2014) calculate that the unweighted elasticity of substitution between goods used 
in Berden et al. (2009) is 6. Unfortunately, Fontagné et al. (2013) do not mention the used 
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elasticity of substitution at all. The unweighted elasticity of substitution used in Francois et al. 
(2013, Table 5) is 6.3. Felbermayr et al. (2015b) set the trade elasticity - the elasticity of trade 
with respect to trade costs - to 7 in their benchmark parameterization. They also discuss that 
the elasticity of substitution between goods, which measures how changes in the price for 
foreign goods influences demand for foreign goods, and the trade elasticity are closely related, 
since the trade elasticity is equal to the elasticity of substitution minus 1. In our model, the 
cross-country substitutability measures alone how fluctuations in the price for foreign goods 
affect demand for foreign goods. Consequently, the cross-country substitutability plus 1 is 
equal to the trade elasticity. So Felbermayr et al. (2015b) set effectively the cross-country 
substitutability to 8. In Aichele et al. (2014), the average elasticity of substitution between 
goods is 5.6. In alternative parameterizations, we set the cross-country substitutability to 6, as 
in Berden et al. (2009) and Aichele et al. (2014), and to 8, as in Felbermayr et al. (2015b). 
 
Table 4 shows the consequences of varying the cross-country substitutability, while we keep 
the import-to-GDP ratio constant at 3% by changing the home bias parameters. Felbermayr et 
al. (2015b), for instance, show that lower values of the elasticity of substitution lead to a higher 
output effect of TTIP, since domestic and foreign goods are less easily substitutable. Table 4 
illustrates that we find the opposite. One of the features of the framework (Ganelli and Tervala 
2015) used in this paper is to alter the underlying steady state of the trade models by the 
introduction of endogenous labor supply. If the cross-country substitutability is high, domestic 
and foreign goods are more easily substitutable and households respond by supplying more 
labor. Consequently, TTIP further increases trade and output. In an imperfectly competitive 
economy with endogenous labor supply, an equal increase in employment and consumption 
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that brings them closer to their efficient levels increases welfare. Therefore, the welfare gains 
of TTIP depend positively on the degree of the cross-country substitutability. 
 
Table 4. Sensitivity Analysis: Different Cross-Country Substitutabilities  
  = 3 
(benchmark) 
 = 6  = 8 
Output 0.16% 0.27% 0.38% 
Trade 17% 33% 42% 
Welfare  1.5% of 
consumption 
2.7% of 
consumption 
3.8% of 
consumption 
 
 
In Section 4.1, we found that under the benchmark parameterization the output effect was 
smaller than in other TTIP studies (Berden et al. 2009, Fontagné et al. 2013 and Francois et al. 
2013) in which the scenario is identical to ours. The fact that we used a lower value of the 
cross-country substitutability in our benchmark parameterization can explain a large part of 
the difference in the output results. Table 4 shows that if the cross-country substitutability is 
set to 6, the output effect of TTIP increases to 0.27%, which is almost as high as in the 
aforementioned studies, of which the average output increase is 0.32%. 
 
Our main focus is the welfare analysis of TTIP. As can be seen from Table 4, the DPV of 
welfare gain is as high as 3.8% of initial consumption, in the case where the cross-country 
substitutability is 8. In this case, the welfare gain on a US (EU) citizen, based on the World 
Bank (2016) data on 2012 GDP per capita in 2014 US dollars, corresponds to a one-off 2,000 
(1,300) US dollars increase (approximately) in consumption. 
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As discussed in Section 3, Drozd et al. (2014) emphasize that trade reacts substantially 
differently to persistent price changes than temporary ones that take place on business cycle 
frequency, and consequently estimates of the cross-country substitutability differ depending 
on the time horizon. In this paper, we inspect the consequences of a policy change that shift 
relative prices permanently. Therefore, for the question at hand, a high cross-country 
substitutability may be a better depiction of reality in the long term. If this is indeed the case, 
Table 4 shows that the welfare gains of TTIP are considerable. 
 
An important distinction of our model relative to the TTIP studies is that we also analyze the 
adjustment dynamics of the economy, and trade liberalization is gradual. If trade liberalization 
is instant, the welfare gain of TTIP will be slightly smaller and increase from 1.5% of 
consumption to 1.6%. 
4.3 Robustness Checks: Tariffs Only 
An important analytical issue is the quantitative relevance of the reduction in tariffs and the 
NTMs when implemented in isolation. Felbermayr (2015) indeed summarizes that all TTIP 
studies conclude that the bulk of the trade and output effects stems from cuts in NTMs. The 
next step is therefore to analyze the effects of a TTIP agreement that leads to the elimination 
of tariffs, while NTMs are kept constant. That is, the trade barrier is reduced from 20.9% to 
18.1%. We show results for both our benchmark value of the cross-country substitutability (3) 
and a higher value that is closer to one employed by the traditional trade literature (6).  
 
Table 5 reveals that a smaller trade liberalization induces an output effect in the range of 0.06% 
to 0.1%. These findings are in line with the other TTIP papers, excluding Felbermayr et al. 
    
 
28 
(2015b). In a “tariffs-only” agreement, the welfare gain becomes smaller and is only 36% the 
baseline scenario’s welfare gain. We can therefore conclude that the bulk of the welfare gain 
of TTIP is caused by cuts in NTMs. 
 
Table 5. Summary of the Effects of the Tariffs-Only Agreement 
 This study 
(  = 3) 
This study 
(  = 6) 
Fontagné 
et al. 
(2013) 
Francois 
et al. 
(2013) 
Felbermayr 
et al. 
(2015b) 
Aichele 
et al. 
(2015) 
Tariff 
reduction 
100% 100% 100% 98–
100% 
100% 100% 
EU GDP 0.06% 0.1% 0% 0.1% 0.27% 
(non-
weighted 
EU27 
mean) 
0.01% 
US GDP 0.06% 0.1% 0% 0.04% 0.75% 0% 
Welfare 0.57% of 
consumption 
1.0% of 
consumption 
    
 
 
5 Conclusions 
We contribute to the TTIP literature by employing a DSGE business cycle model that enables 
the welfare analysis of TTIP. We find that the discounted present value of the welfare gain of 
TTIP is worth 1.5% of initial consumption for a representative consumer in our baseline 
calibration. This is equivalent to a one-off 780 (510) US dollars increase in consumption for 
the US (EU) consumer.  
 
At the same time, we need to mention the limitations of our approach because it ignores several 
channels through which trade liberalization in general and TTIP in particular may affect 
welfare. First, there are many additional gains from trade that have been elicited in the literature 
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and which our model is unable to capture, including the traditional gains from specialization, 
the gains from access to a larger market allowing the exploitation of scale economies 
(Krugman, 1980), the gains from the reallocation of resources towards more productive firms 
resulting in higher aggregate productivity (Melitz, 2003) and the gains associated from 
productivity gains related to importing inputs to production (see the numerous references in 
the survey by Hornok and Koren (2016)). All those gains would reinforce our argument 
because they result in aggregate productivity increases.  
 
Second, and against the backdrop of these gains from trade liberalization, its severe costs and 
the unequal distribution of those costs across affected societies also need to be considered. As 
Hornok and Koren (2016) report in a survey, there is ample evidence (and theory to explain it) 
that trade increases inequality, and that the associated costs may be larger than previously 
thought. However, the academic debate on the needed redistribution from the winners of 
liberalization towards its losers in order to achieve Pareto gains has occupied generations of 
trade economists. The lack of sufficient redistribution has been and continues to be a serious 
concern, and should be dealt with more seriously both in the public and in the academic debate. 
In particular, the costs of inequality and the costs of redistribution should be taken into account 
(Antrak et al. (2016) is a valuable start in that direction), while efforts into an analysis of labor 
market policies are needed to inform the public debate (Cosar (2013) and Davidson and Matusz 
(2006) are examples in this vein).        
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